In a concurrence, Justice Blackmun agreed with the majority. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, concurred in part and dissented in part. Justice Stevens, in his concurrence in part and dissent in part, noted that the Court should address the original issue, i. Justice Stevens concluded that the search was not justified at its inception because the school administrator had no reason to believe that T.
Thus, the search violated the Fourth Amendment and the evidence should be suppressed. Disclaimer Please Note : This activity is meant to help high school students understand, as part of their civics education, the key facts and holdings of a well-known U. Supreme Court case. A link is provided to the Supreme Court decision. This activity is not meant to provide a legal analysis of this case or any related matters. It in no way provides legal advice or guidance on this or other issues.
The provisions of the first Ten Amendments to the Constitution, i. In , the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. In several cases, the U. Supreme Court has incorporated various provisions of the Fourth Amendment, and related judicial rulings, to the states.
For instance, in Mapp v. Ohio, U. Of course, even then, the Supreme Court was no stranger to cases related to students and education. Nicandro Iannacci is a web content strategist at the National Constitution Center.
Toggle navigation. In adopting this unclear, unprecedented, and unnecessary departure from generally applicable Fourth Amendment standards, the Court carves out a broad exception to standards that this Court has developed over years of considering Fourth Amendment problems.
Its decision is supported neither by precedent nor even by a fair application of the "balancing test" it proclaims in this very opinion. It is evident that the school setting requires some easing of the restrictions to which searches by public authorities are ordinarily subject.
The warrant requirement, in particular, is unsuited to the school environment: requiring a teacher to obtain a warrant before searching a child suspected of an infraction of school rules or of the criminal law would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the schools. Just as we have in other cases dispensed with the warrant requirement when "the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search," Camara v.
The school setting also requires some modification of the level of suspicion of illicit activity needed to justify a search. Ordinarily, a search—even one that may permissibly be carried out without a warrant—must be based upon "probable cause" to believe that a violation of the law has occurred.
New York, U. However, "probable cause" is not an irreducible requirement of a valid search. The fundamental command of the Fourth Amendment is that searches and seizures be reasonable, and although "both the concept of probable cause and the requirement of a warrant bear on the reasonableness of a search,. United States, supra, U. Thus, we have in a number of cases recognized the legality of searches and seizures based on suspicions that, although "reasonable," do not rise to the level of probable cause.
Brignoni-Ponce, U. Prouse, U. Martinez-Fuerte, U. Camara v. Where a careful balancing of governmental and private interests suggests that the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable cause, we have not hesitated to adopt such a standard. We join the majority of courts that have examined this issue 6 in concluding that the accommodation of the privacy interests of schoolchildren with the substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools does not require strict adherence to the requirement that searches be based on probable cause to believe that the subject of the search has violated or is violating the law.
Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a twofold inquiry: first, one must consider "whether the. Under ordinary circumstances, a search of a student by a teacher or other school official 7 will be "justified at its inception" when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school. This standard will, we trust, neither unduly burden the efforts of school authorities to maintain order in their schools nor authorize unrestrained intrusions upon the privacy of schoolchildren.
By focusing attention on the question of reasonableness, the standard will spare teachers and school administrators the necessity of schooling themselves in the niceties of probable cause and permit them to regulate their conduct according to the dictates of reason and common sense. At the same time, the reasonableness standard should ensure that the interests of students will be invaded no more than is necessary to achieve the legitimate end of preserving order in the schools.
There remains the question of the legality of the search in this case. We recognize that the "reasonable grounds" standard applied by the New Jersey Supreme Court in its consideration of this question is not substantially different from the standard that we have adopted today. Nonetheless, we believe that the New Jersey court's application of that standard to strike down the search of T.
Our review of the facts surrounding the search leads us to conclude that the search was in no sense unreasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes. The incident that gave rise to this case actually involved two separate searches, with the first—the search for cigarettes providing the suspicion that gave rise to the second the search for marihuana. Although it is the fruits of the second search that are at issue here, the validity of the search for marihuana must depend on the reasonableness of the initial search for cigarettes, as there would have been no reason to suspect that T.
Accordingly, it is to the search for cigarettes that we first turn our attention. The New Jersey Supreme Court pointed to two grounds for its holding that the search for cigarettes was unreasonable.
First, the court observed that possession of cigarettes was not in itself illegal or a violation of school rules. Because the contents of T. Choplick in this particular case had no reasonable grounds to suspect that T.
At best, according to the court, Mr. Choplick had "a good hunch. Both these conclusions are implausible. Surely it cannot be said that under these circumstances, T. To be sure, the discovery of the cigarettes would not prove that T. But it is universally recognized that evidence, to be relevant to an inquiry, need not conclusively prove the ultimate fact in issue, but only have "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
Rule Evid. The relevance of T. See Warden v. Hayden, U. Thus, if Mr. Choplick in fact had a reasonable suspicion that T.
Choplick had no reasonable suspicion that the purse would contain cigarettes. This conclusion is puzzling. A teacher had reported that T. Certainly this report gave Mr. Choplick reason to suspect that T. Choplick's suspicion that there were cigarettes in the purse was not an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,' " Terry v. United States v. Cortez, U. Of course, even if the teacher's report were true, T. But the requirement of reasonable suspicion is not a requirement of absolute certainty: "sufficient probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.
California, U. Because the hypothesis that T. Accordingly, it cannot be said that Mr. Choplick acted unreasonably when he examined T. Our conclusion that Mr. Choplick's decision to open T.
The suspicion upon which the search for marihuana was founded was provided when Mr. Choplick observed a package of rolling papers in the purse as he removed the pack of cigarettes. Although T. Choplick's belief that the rolling papers indicated the presence of marihuana, she does contend that the scope of the search Mr.
Choplick conducted exceeded permissible bounds when he seized and read certain letters that implicated T. This argument, too, is unpersuasive. The discovery of the rolling papers concededly gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that T. This suspicion justified further exploration of T.
Under these circumstances, it was not unreasonable to extend the search to a separate zippered compartment of the purse; and when a search of that compartment revealed an index card containing a list of "people who owe me money" as well as two letters, the inference that T.
Choplick in examining the letters to determine whether they contained any further evidence. In short, we cannot conclude that the search for marihuana was unreasonable in any respect.
Because the search resulting in the discovery of the evidence of marihuana dealing by T. Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of New Jersey is. I agree with the Court's decision, and generally with its opinion. I would place greater emphasis, however, on the special characteristics of elementary and secondary schools that make it unnecessary to afford students the same constitutional protections granted adults and juveniles in a nonschool setting.
In any realistic sense, students within the school environment have a lesser expectation of privacy than members of the population generally. They spend the school hours in close association with each other, both in the classroom and during recreation periods. The students in a particular class often know each other and their teachers quite well.
Of necessity, teachers have a degree of familiarity with, and authority over, their students that is unparalleled except perhaps in the relationship between parent and child. It is simply unrealistic to think that students have the same subjective expectation of privacy as the population generally.
But for purposes of deciding this case, I can assume that children in school—no less than adults—have privacy interests that society is prepared to recognize as legitimate. However one may characterize their privacy expectations, students properly are afforded some constitutional protections.
In an often quoted statement, the Court said that students do not "shed their constitutional rights. The Court also has "emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the states and of school officials. See also Epperson v. Arkansas, U.
The Court has balanced the interests of the student against the school officials' need to maintain discipline by recognizing qualitative differences between the constitutional remedies to which students and adults are entitled. In Goss v. The only process found to be "due" was notice and a hearing described as "rudimentary"; it amounted to no more than "the disciplinarian. In Ingraham v. We emphasized in that opinion that familiar constraints in the school, and also in the community, provide substantial protection against the violation of constitutional rights by school authorities.
Even while at school, the child brings with him the support of family and friends and is rarely apart from teachers and other pupils who may witness and protest any instances of mistreatment. The Ingraham Court further pointed out that the "openness of the public school and its supervision by the community afford significant safeguards" against the violation of constitutional rights. The special relationship between teacher and student also distinguishes the setting within which schoolchildren operate.
Law enforcement officers function as adversaries of criminal suspects. These officers have the responsibility to investigate criminal activity, to locate and arrest those who violate our laws, and to facilitate the charging and bringing of such persons to trial.
Rarely does this type of adversarial relationship exist between school authorities and pupils. The attitude of the typical teacher is one of personal responsibility for the student's welfare as well as for his education. The primary duty of school officials and teachers, as the Court states, is the education and training of young people. A State has a compelling interest in assuring that the schools meet this responsibility. Without first establishing discipline and maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to educate their students.
And apart from education, the school has the obligation to protect pupils from mistreatment by other children, and also to protect teachers themselves from violence by the few students whose conduct in recent years has prompted national concern. For me, it would be unreasonable and at odds with history to argue that the full panoply of constitutional rules applies with the same force and effect in the schoolhouse as it does in the enforcement of criminal laws.
In sum, although I join the Court's opinion and its holding, 3 my emphasis is somewhat different. I join the judgment of the Court and agree with much that is said in its opinion. I write separately, however, because I believe the Court omits a crucial step in its analysis of whether a school search must be based upon probable-cause.
The Court correctly states that we have recognized limited exceptions to the probable-cause requirement "[w]here a careful balancing of governmental and private interests suggests that the public interest is best served" by a lesser standard. Ante, at I believe that we have used such a balancing test, rather than strictly applying the Fourth Amendment 's Warrant and Probable-Cause Clause, only when we were confronted with "a special law enforcement need for greater flexibility.
Royer, U. I pointed out in United States v. Place, U. See Texas v. Brown, U. Rabinowitz, U. See also Dunaway v.
United States District Court, U. Only in those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable, is a court entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for that of the Framers. Thus, for example, in determining that police can conduct a limited "stop and frisk" upon less than probable cause, this Court relied upon the fact that "as a practical matter" the stop and frisk could not be subjected to a warrant and probable-cause requirement, because a law enforcement officer must be able to take immediate steps to assure himself that the person he has stopped to question is not armed with a weapon that could be used against him.
Similarly, this Court's holding that a roving Border Patrol may stop a car and briefly question its occupants upon less than probable cause was based in part upon "the absence of practical alternatives for policing the border. See also Michigan v. Long, U. The Court's implication that the balancing test is the rule rather than the exception is troubling for me because it is unnecessary in this case. The elementary and secondary school setting presents a special need for flexibility justifying a departure from the balance struck by the Framers.
As Justice POWELL notes, "[w]ithout first establishing discipline and maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to educate their students. Maintaining order in the classroom can be a difficult task. A single teacher often must watch over a large number of students, and, as any parent knows, children at certain ages are inclined to test the outer boundaries of acceptable conduct and to imitate the misbehavior of a peer if that misbehavior is not dealt with quickly.
Every adult remembers from his own schooldays the havoc a water pistol or peashooter can wreak until it is taken away. Thus, the Court has recognized that "[e]vents calling for discipline are frequent occurrences and sometimes require immediate, effective action.
Indeed, because drug use and possession of weapons have become increasingly common among young people, an immediate response frequently is required not just to maintain an environment conducive to learning, but to protect the very safety of students and school personnel. Such immediate action obviously would not be possible if a teacher were required to secure a warrant before searching a student.
Nor would it be possible if a teacher could not conduct a necessary search until the teacher thought there was probable cause for the search. A teacher has neither the training nor the day-to-day experience in the complexities of probable cause that a law enforcement officer possesses, and is ill-equipped to make a quick judgment about the existence of probable cause.
The time required for a teacher to ask the questions or make the observations that are necessary to turn reasonable grounds into probable cause is time during which the teacher, and other students, are diverted from the essential task of education.
A teacher's focus is, and should be, on teaching and helping students, rather than on developing evidence against a particular troublemaker. Education "is perhaps the most important function" of government, Brown v. Board of Education, U. The special need for an immediate response to behavior that threatens either the safety of schoolchildren and teachers or the educational process itself justifies the Court in excepting school searches from the warrant and probable-cause requirement, and in applying a standard determined by balancing the relevant interests.
I agree with the standard the Court has announced, and with its application of the standard to the facts of this case.
I therefore concur in its judgment. I fully agree with Part II of the Court's opinion. Teachers, like all other government officials, must conform their conduct to the Fourth Amendment 's protections of personal privacy and personal security. As Justice STEVENS points out, post, at , , this principle is of particular importance when applied to schoolteachers, for children learn as much by example as by exposition.
It would be incongruous and futile to charge teachers with the task of embuing their students with an understanding of our system of constitutional democracy, while at the same time immunizing those same teachers from the need to respect constitutional protections. See Board of Education v. Pico, U. I do not, however, otherwise join the Court's opinion.
Today's decision sanctions school officials to conduct full-scale searches on a "reasonableness" standard whose only definite content is that it is not the same test as the "probable cause" standard found in the text of the Fourth Amendment. In adopting this unclear, unprecedented, and unnecessary departure from generally applicable Fourth Amendment standards, the Court carves out a broad exception to standards that this Court has developed over years of considering Fourth Amendment problems.
Its decision is supported neither by precedent nor even by a fair application of the "balancing test" it proclaims in this very opinion. First, warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, subject only to a few specifically delineated and well-recognized exceptions.
Wisconsin, U. Arizona, U. Second, full-scale searches—whether conducted in accordance with the warrant requirement or pursuant to one of its exceptions—are "reasonable" in Fourth Amendment terms only on a showing of probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that evidence of the crime will be found in the place to be searched. Beck v. Third, categories of intrusions that are substantially less intrusive than full-scale searches or seizures may be justifiable in accordance with a balancing test even absent a warrant or probable cause, provided that the balancing test used gives sufficient weight to the privacy interests that will be infringed.
Dunaway v. Ohio, supra. Assistant Vice Principal Choplick's thorough excavation of T. Unlike the searches in Terry v. Ohio, supra, or Adams v. Williams, U. To be faithful to the Court's settled doctrine, the inquiry therefore must focus on the warrant and probable-cause requirements. I agree that schoolteachers or principals, when not acting as agents of law enforcement authorities, generally may conduct a search of their students' belongings without first obtaining a warrant.
To agree with the Court on this point is to say that school searches may justifiably be held to that extent to constitute an exception to the Fourth Amendment 's warrant requirement. Such an exception, however, is not to be justified, as the Court apparently holds, by assessing net social value through application of an unguided "balancing test" in which "the individual's legitimate expectations of privacy and personal security" are weighed against "the government's need for effective methods to deal with breaches of public order.
The Warrant Clause is something more than an exhortation to this Court to maximize social welfare as we see fit. It requires that the authorities must obtain a warrant before conducting a full-scale search. The undifferentiated governmental interest in law enforcement is insufficient to justify an exception to the warrant requirement. Rather, some special governmental interest beyond the need merely to apprehend lawbreakers is necessary to justify a categorical exception to the warrant requirement.
For the most part, special governmental needs sufficient to override the warrant requirement flow from "exigency"—that is, from the press of time that makes obtaining a warrant either impossible or hopelessly infeasible. Place, supra, U. Arizona, supra, U. Only after finding an extraordinary governmental interest of this kind do we—or ought we—engage in a balancing test to determine if a warrant should nonetheless be required.
To require a showing of some extraordinary governmental interest before dispensing with the warrant requirement is not to undervalue society's need to apprehend violators of the criminal law. As part of this update, all LandmarkCases.
It will also give you access to hundreds of additional resources and Supreme Court case summaries! We apologize for any inconvenience, but hope that having only one Street Law account to remember will make your life easier. You can reach us at landmarkcases streetlaw. The warrant requirement, in particular, is unsuited to the school environment. Such a search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.
This case explores the legal concept of search and seizure. A New Jersey high school student was accused of violating school rules by smoking in the restroom, leading an assistant principal to search her purse for cigarettes.
The vice principal discovered marijuana and other items that implicated the student in dealing marijuana which was illegal. The student tried to have the evidence from her purse suppressed because the search was a violation of her Fourth Amendment rights.
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